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Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry
Gary Shapiro
Since Socrates' attack on poetry, philosophers and critics have been
faced with the problem of reconciling two convictions which seem
equally pressing. While poetry (or imaginative literature) is and has
been valued as a source of insight and knowledge, it also seems clear
that poetic meaning is of a rather different sort than that found in
science, ordinary language, or (to introduce the classical contrast)
prose. Philosophical theories of poetry, then, take one of two forms:
either they deny one of these two beliefs, implying perhaps that
poetry has only nonsensical or literal meaning, or they provide a
cognitive analysis of poetry which differentiates its meaning from
that of prose. Hegel took the second alternative, maintaining both
that poetry "has been the most universal and cosmopolitan instructor ofthe human race" and that the logic or meaning of poetrv
is radically unprosaic' Poetry's cognitive value, like that of
philosophy, religion, and the other forms of art, can be expressed
most generally by saying that it is a form of absolute spirit in whieh
knowledge is thorough self-knowledge; the mode or form of this
knowledge is reason or dialectic as opposed to the rigid categories of
the understanding. These formulas by themselves are not
illuminating, being in Hegel's terms mere abstract universals; they
take on concrete meaning only when we see them functioning iti
their capacity of actually explaining the essential forms, aspects, expressions, and historical varieties of poetry.
What is interesting about Hegel's analysis of poetry, then, is his
attempt to show that it is not only a form of knowledge, but a form
which is quite distinct from that of prosaic thought. Both features
follow from the claim that the content of poetic knowledge is dialectical, as is the content of all art, religion, and philosophy for
Hegel; all are concerned with comprehending the contradictions,
movements, and resolutions of Spirit (Geist) which is the fullest
expression of a dialectical activity. Hegel's conception of
poetry could be approached simply within the context of his own
system by following his exposition of the idea, means of expressioti,
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and realized varieties of poetry, or regressing further, by examining
poetry's place among the arts or by considering the general notion of
dialectic or spirit. While all ofthese aspects of Hegel's thought need
to be understood in order to comprehend his theory of poetry, it may
clarify things to see how his analysis handles a difficulty which has
been encountered in the philosophical and critical analysis of poetic
meaning. After suggesting the force of Hegel's analysis in this way I
will examine it in some detail; and since the theory offers a cognitive
defense of poetry by assimilating poetic to philosophical meaning, it
will be necessary to raise some questions about the relationship of
philosophy and poetry which pose difficulties for Hegel's account.
I
One might begin by questioning one or both of the claims mentioned earlier: that poetry is a form of knowledge and that it is to be
dearly distinguished from a conventional or literalistic type of
knowledge (traditionally called prose). Yet a denial of either runs
against the firm convictions of most of those who have taken poetry
at all seriously. A philosopher might very well hold a theory, like the
positivist criterion of meaning, which had the consequence that
poetry was either meaningless or had merely emotive meaning. But
the conflict of such a theory with both common and uncommon
sense concerning poetry would itself be a good reason for doubting
it. It is, of course, conceivable that we might be led to give up either
or both ofthese claims by some very convincing philosophical system
or theory. In the absence of such a theory, however, what is needed is
to understand what is already believed, following Anselm's example
in regard to the existence of God.
There is a popular cognitive conception of poetry which sees the
need for a non-prosaic analysis of poetic meaning. The conception is
not only popular among critics and aestheticians, but can make
some claim to being the dominant poetics of our time. It is general
enough to be found among literary critics, analytic philosophers,
and existentialists who are otherwise of markedly diverse persuasions. Since it is an approach which Hegel was aware of and consciously rejected it offers us a point of access to his own thought
about poetry. The conception I have in mind will be called the theory
of implicit meaning. (This follows a suggestion by Monroe Beards%, although the th«)ry itself is a set of claims which cannot as a
whole be attributed with ease to any specific pewon, although many
share them in large part.)^ The theory begins with the realization
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that poetry is meaningful rather than nonsensical although its
deviation from science, semantically and syntactically correct
language (or, pejoratively, "steno-language" or "Gerede" — idle
chatter) is clearly seen. Poetic meaning is said to be implicit because
it is suggested, referred to, or symbolized rather than being actually
present in the literary work. Moreover the meanings in question are
intrinsically and not accidentally implicit; they are not literal
meanings which could be directly stated, for which poetic expressions would in that case simply be a code, but they remain implicit because of some special characteristic. The nature of this
characteristic is variously understood in theories of metaphorical,
s)Tnbolical, mythical, and imagistic meaning. The central point of
the theory from which these competing versions derive, however, is
the insistence that the meaning in question is not and cannot be fully
presented in the poem. In a theory of poetic ambiguity like William
Empson's, for example, poetic significance is understood as the
ability to suggest a wealth of possible meanings which are interrelated in a complex fashion. Such ambiguity cannot be explicit
because it involves a continuum of possibilities which no actual
linguistic structure can include or contain, and so it can only he
evoked. When questions of poetic value arise it is natural that such
theories find the higher forms of poetry to be those which not only
maximize the element of implicit or suggested meaning but show an
awareness of the tension between what is (or can be) actually said
and what is evoked or symbolized. It is in this perspective that we
can make some sense of Heidegger's puzzling claim that "in the
familiar appearances, the poet calls the alien as that to which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is—unknown.'"
Although those who are given to close analyses of the nature of
metaphor or symbol might protest rather vigorously at being
associated with apocalyptic utterances of this sort, the common
element in the many theories of implicit meaning is precisely the insistence on a tension between the limited actuality of the poem and
the indefinite possibility ofthe poetic meaning.
From Hegel's point of wew, the difficulty with such a theory is not
so much in working out the details of the analysis of implicit
meaning but with the assumption that such meaning i*
paradigmatically poetic. There is indeed a variety of poetry which
can be properly called symbolical and the metaphor is a conscious
comparison of an indefinite sort; yet these are the absolutely
minimal forms of poetry aad ite language rather than its exemplarsThe fact of poetic tension and symbolism derives on Hegel's account
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from the general conditions of art: it seeks to express a spiritual content within a sensuous form. Simply as art, poetry, whose
imaginative medium is the finest attenuation ofthe sensory forms of
the other arts, will exhibit a symbolical aspect. Symbolical poetry
proper, however, is that which does not go beyond this sense of
disparity or opposition." In certain forms of religious poetry, for
example, God is conceived as utterly sublime and unknowable and
yet a wealth of specific things and properties of the world are mentioned simply in order to emphasize the contrast of the finite and the
infinite. Metaphorical language is a conscious development of the
same tendency to make meaning merely symbolical or implicit,
although it generally reflects a more conscious artistry than the
poetry of the sublime. A metaphor has both primary and secondary
subjects which are juxtaposed in such a way as to create a novel spectrum of possible meanings which could not be expressed by a literal
comparison. Such forms, however, testify to their own incompleteness, for they point to a fulfilled meaning which, by
hypothesis, can never be made present. The symbolical or
metaphorical poet, like the religious man of the unhappy consciousness, is acutely aware of the opposition between what he actually does and says and what he wants to mean and enjoy; and while
he may succeed in showing the limits of the former he is prevented
by his own methods from making the latter manifest. The symbolic
poet may also appear in the form of the oracle whose utterances are
deliberately vague and open to endless interpretation.
At this point it may seem as if Hegel's objections to the theory of
implicit meaning hold only for those varieties of it which agree with
him that poetry is intentional. Suppose, however, that one regards
such things as metaphors and symbols as simply part of the texture
or surface of a poem, which can be recognized and understood
without any reference to the poet's intentions. Still, insofar as one
holds that these aspects of poetry are to be analyzed as implicit
meanings, Hegel's criticism applies equally; for i*- is not the meaning
which is supposed to be manifest here but simply the reference to it.
Hegel's own conception of poetry is based not on the minimal
characteristics of the art but on its realization in those works of the
imagination whose meaning is luminous and compelling. Along with
the advocates of implicit meaning he realizes that poetry is not
propositional or prosaic. For Hegel, however, the poetic alternative
to the prose ofthe understanding is not an indefinite meaning or an
ineffable experience, but the speculative comprehension of the
dialectical nature of spirit. The tension which the theory of implicit
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meaning detects between the actual and the possible in a poem is a
kind of image of this dialectic of spirit but one that tums out to be
ultimately inadequate in the same way that symbolism generally fails
to fulfill its promise. It is true that the symbolical or metaphorical
tension itself must be exhibited or presented, rather than merely
described, and to this extent it is radically other than what can be
communicated through prosaic propositions. Yet there is a tendency
to equate the non-proposidonal with the ineffable or the nonconceptual in this account which Hegel strongly resists. As in
philosophy, the proposidonal form is inadequate in poetry not
because its content is available only through an esoteric intuition of
some sort, but on account ofthe spiritual content being itself dialectical. Hegel's arguments against romantic intuitionism in philosophy
(as in the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit) find a parallel
in his characterization of s}mibolic poetry as an indefinite groping
toward an indefinite content.
II
The theory of implicit meaning requires us to suppose that poems
have purposes or intentions, although some of its proponents are
skeptical in various degrees about the possibility of discerning any
such purposes which are not immanent and manifest in the text of
the poem. Hegel's conception of poetry's dialectical meaning also
depends upon noticing this purposive feature; but Hegel differs from
the theory of implicit meaning in his claim that in the paradigmatic
cases of poetry such purposes are actually fulfilled in the poem. As in
his analyses of other phenomena of spirit, like history and religion,
Hegel's interest is to show just how the purpose of the activity in
question is fulfilled. Since tfie subject matter (spirit) is dialectical,
the study of the purpose and its realization will exhibit the tensions
and contradictions which are appropriate to that particular form of
activity. It is not that Hegel applies a "dialectical method" to a subject matter in order to deduce its necessary characteristics; it is the
subject matter itself which has a dialectical character. In his Encyclopedia he emphasizes that dialectic is primarily a feature of the
world:
It is customary to treat Dialectic as an adventitious art, which
for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of contradiction into definite notions. . . . But in its
true and proper character. Dialectic is the very nature and
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essence of everything predicated by the mere understanding
. . . by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency outwards by
which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of
understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the
negation of them.*
So far there may not appear to be any decisive difference between
Hegel's conception and that of the theory of implicit meaning. For
the latter insists, as does Hegel, on the limited character of the
images, figures, and symbols actually presented in a poem, contrasting it with the many possible meanings which are implicitly
referred to. Poetry of the symbolic type, which is paradigmatic for
the theory of implicit meaning, could be viewed as a way of demonstrating the mere finitude of that which is finite. Now Hegel himself
describes symbolic poetry in just this way. The difference between
the two perspectives has to do with Hegel's analysis of how dialectical meanings are realized in poetry. Typically, Hegel analyzes
spiritual activities in terms of three aspects: the general idea or purpose, abstractly considered; the medium or means in which or by
which the purpose is carried out; and the concrete or realized end of
the activity. In understanding history as the development of
freedom, for example, we must inquire into the genera! idea of
freedom (rational conscious self-determination), the means by which
freedom is actualized in the world (the passions and interests of
human beings), and the end or realization of freedom (concrete
ethical life having its goal in the state). The corresponding aspects of
poetry are the idea of a comprehension of the dialectical nature of
spirit, the medium and means of poetic expression, and the actual
poetic genres (the epic, lyric, and drama).
The purpose or idea of poetry sets it apart from prose both
because its object is explicitly taken to be spirit and because it comprehends this object through a dialectical transformation of the
categories ofthe understanding. In this respect, poetry is simply one
form of art which, along with religion and philosophy, are the three
modes of spirit's knowledge of itself. A more definite notion of the
idea of poetry in particular and of its medium emerges when poetry
is located within the general context of art. According to Hegel, art is
spirit's knowledge of itself in a sensuous form. Philosophy and
•^ligion are also modes of spiritual self-knowledge; while religion
<=an dispense with sensuous representations (although it employs
"gures and myths), philosophy reaches its goal through the medium
of thought itself without limitation by either sense or story. The
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various arts can be understood in terms of the relation in each between sensuous form and spiritual content: there is a progressive
liberation from material and sensuous constraints in the series whieh
begins with architecture and sculpture and passes through painting
(the art of color) and music (the art of tone) to poetry which employs
language simply as an extemal sign of the imaginative life of spirit.
In contrast to all other arts "what the end is now is to express immediately for spirit [Geist] the manifestations of spirit with all its
ideas of imagination and art, without setting forth their visible and
bodily presence."' Poetry is an art in the process of dissolution, for
its extemal and objective aspect is, paradoxically, "the innej
imagination and intuition itself ]das innere Vorstellen und Anschauen selbsty Hegel conceives ofthe imagination as thought in a
concrete form or aspect: it is not the images of Plato's painters or the
faculty of recalling or reproducing such images which is at stake
here, but a creative power of thought which nevertheless retains
some of the specificity and particularity of the sensuous world. The
distinction is close to that which English critics, especiaUy of the
romantic period, have drawn between fancy and imagination, or the
primary and secondary imagination.* The poetic comprehension of
the hero differs from the philosophical because it imagines him as
Achilles or Oedipus, a man of a particular nationality, character,
and individuality rather than analyzing in what heroism of this or
that type consists. Poetry and speculative thought are alike in considering the hero dialectically, but it is only poetry which is constrained to do so imaginatively. Hegel's conception of poetry can be
briefly characterized as imaginative dialectic, if we remember that
imagination is not reducible to static images. It is a striking fact, for
both Plato and Hegel, that poetry not only employs or conjures up
such images but that they are oftefl unnatural and even internally inconsistent or incongruously connected with one another from ^
naturalistic point of view; while Plato takes this as evidence fot
assimilating poetry to mere opinion and illusion, Hegel detects
a power and structure in the play of imagra which is fun"
damentally analogous to the dialectical structure which philosophy
finds in t h i n ^ generally. It is worth noting that it is imagination, not
language, which is the medium of poetry. Language is simply a sign
ofthe imaginative idea.
Accordingly Hegel claims that a great poem is in principle translatable not only from one language to another, but from verse io
prose.' Although many modern critics might dispute this, it seems to
be empirically confirmed in addition to following from Hegel*
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views. Certainly it is less strange to suggest that a poem can be translated than to claim that a building or a painting could be translated into a different material medium or colors. Paradigmatic
works of the literary imagination — Homer, Sophocles, Cervantes,
Shakespeare — are translated and read in translation incessantly.
Those aspects which seem to escape translation are either specific
associations ofthe original language which have no equivalent in the
translator's, or the effects of tone, meter, and rhythm. Yet to some
extent these are not difficulties in principle, but only in practice; explanations or metaphors may elucidate a strange meaning where
there is no single literal equivalent and foreign meters may be approximated by a skilled poet. Where the claim of untranslatability is
most plausible—in respect to a short lyric poem—it is usually
because we are concerned with a work which lies somewhere on the
boundary of poetry and music.
As imaginative dialectic, poetry does what philosophy does but in
a more immediate form. In the following contrast which Hegel draws
between the comprehension ofthe dialectic of things in pure thought
and in poetry, there are grounds for doubting that he takes
philosophy to be capable of doing poetry's job better than poetry
does:
reason... does not rest satisfied with the differentiations and
external relations proper to the conceptions and distinctions
of the understanding; it unites them in a free totality, which
in the apprehension of our finite faculty fails to prove its selfconsistency. . . although it grasps and comprehends actual
things in their essential separation and their actual existence,
it does also nevertheless translate this particularify into the
ideal element of the universal, in which alone thought is at
home with itself. Consequently there arises, in contrast to the
world of phenomena, a world that is new in this sense, that
though the truth ofthe actual [yVirklichen] is present, it is not
displayed in actuality itself as the formative power and very
own soul of the same. Thinking is only a reconciliation of
truth with reality in thought; poetic creation and construction, however, is a reconciliation in the mode of real appearance itself, although merely in a spiritually imaginative
form \geistig vorgestellten Form ].'"
The realization of this imaginative dialectic occurs in the actual
poems which carry out this program of overcoming the fixed op-
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positions ofthe understanding. The sequence ofthese forms is not so
much chronological as logical; they form a series in which the purpose of poetry is actualized more and more fully. That is, they show a
progressive overcoming ofthe usual categories ofthe understanding,
in particular cause and eifect and subject and object.
The epic is appropriately the simplest form of major poetry
because its approach resembles the impersonal, spectatorial attitude
of history. The epic poet seems simply to describe a world in his song
as the naive historian or chronicler narrates a series of events. So far
the usual distinction of subject and object is observed, but an
analysis of the world and action of the epic discloses a different conception. The hero's career itself can be understood neither as a
direct effect of the social world from which it arises nor, alternatively, as the cause of that world. Using the categories of the understanding we might view society as composed of independent
units, externally related either by voluntary acts or contingent circumstances, or as a cultural unit whose holistic properties detennine
the characteristics of its members. The epic offers (at least in
imagination) an alternative to these one-sided views. The hero
emerges out of his world, and to that extent he is an expression of it;
yet at the same time he is a distinctive individual with a remarkable
character who undertakes unusual actions. Achilles is not simply a
paradigm of what the Greek warrior should be, but in his demand
for honor from Zeus and his consuming wrath his individuality transcends its origins. The world of the epic, in order to make such
figures and actions possible, must itself be a poetic world. Socially, it
is one in which loose relations of allegiance based mainly on personal quality and achievement have not yet been superseded by law
and order. It is even poetic in its attitude toward objects of daily use;
a division has not yet been made between the fine and the useful
arts, so that a door, a tripod, or a knife are as worthy of description
as the battles of the heroes. Here Hegel uses "poetic" in his own
systematic sense: it is a world which is not yet ruled by the prosaic
categories of the understanding but is imaginatively conceived. The
epic poet is a kind of primitive phenomenologist who observes the
dialectical patterns of the heroic world.''
The lyric poem is an individual, subjective expression which lacks
the compass of the epic; yet its imaginative structure is a variation
on the same theme. The lyric attitude is that of a reflective mind
which has withdrawn from a highly regularized extemal world, and
now assimilates that world through the power of its own expression.
The lyric itself involves a clash between this individud expression
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and the subject matter (whose variety is infinite) which is to be
assimilated. Here again the division is not a fixed one:
It is above all the stress of this opposition, which renders
inevitable the swing and the boldness of utterance and image,
the apparent absence of order in the ideal construction and
course of the poem, its digressions, lacunae, and sudden transitions, and which preserves the ideal elevation ofthe poet, by
means of the mastery with which he is enabled, through the
artistic perfection of his work, to overcome this disunion,
and to produce an essentially harmonious whole, which
places him, as his work, in relief above the greatness of his
subject.'^
The burden ofthe lyric is the clash between "the compelling force of
the subject matter" and the "independent freedom of the poet";
since it occurs in the imagination it requires a feeling of shock or
randomness in the texture of the poem itself. Not only does Hegel
make no effort to deduce or justify the specific nature of this clash, it
is a consequence of his theory that such characteristics are necessarily contingent. Hegel's theory is deductive here not in its attempt to
determine concrete details but only in its insistence that it is part of
the idea of the poem that there be striking features of it which
present themselves as random, indeterminate, or chaotic.
The drama is not only dialectical in its structure but represents a
dialectical combination of the epic and the lyric. While it presents
characters before us in their objectivity, like the epic, these characters have the self-expressive power of the lyric poet. The dialectical
relationship between the individual and his worid is roughly similar
to that in the epic; but in this context the "world" is nothing but
similarly situated individuals. In the drama subjective spirit arises
out of a world, becomes individual, determinate, and constitutive of
the world. In this process it can be said with equal justification that
the subjective becomes objective and the objective becomes subjective. The dramatic careers of the various characters are what they
are only through conflict, collision, and resolution; the appearance
of self-subsistency is pushed to the extreme by the dramatic mode of
presentation but dissolved or mediated in another perspective by the
dramatic action. Insofar as a resolution or reconciliation is offered in
the drama, it cannot have its source in the individual characters, but
to accomplish tiiis the drama itself "wil! have to propound to us the
^tal energy of a principle of necessity which is essentially self-
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supporting, and capable of resolving every conflict and contradiction.'"' In dramatic poetry the metaphor finds one of its true
artistic functions, for in modem drama (and Hegel is thinking of
Shakespeare in particular here) the richly metaphorical speech of
the characters does not point to an indefinite meaning but, as an action of their own, shows an ability to transcend and dissolve the objective situation, even at the height of danger or despair. Metaphor is
poetic just to the extent that it is aujgehoben.
If we make a distinction between form and content in poetrj',
metaphoric tension or implicit meaning arises out of the formal contradiction which poetry exhibits between its imaginative medium
and spirit; while the content of poetry has to do with spirit's contradictions with itself. The converse of Shakespearean drama, in
which metaphorical form is transmuted into spiritual content, is that
type of modem poetry in which the poet takes the poetic activity itself as a subject for metaphorical or symbolic exploration. As in
Holderlin's poetry, which Heidegger so admires, spiritual content
becomes the vehicle of implicit meaning. Of course, poetry which is
conscious of itself as poetry illustrates Hegel's own categories of
analysis as well as providing a parallel to his conception of
philosophy as the conscious knowledge of its own history. However,
by inverting the relationship between form and content, romantic
symbolism fmds its appropriate theme in the prophetic anticipation
of an unknown god, falling back into another variation of the
unhappy consciousness.
By insisting on the dialectical nature of poetic meaning Hegel
makes a cognitive defense of poetry which allies it with philosophy.
The analogy between the two is not their shared deviation from
tautology or empirical verifiability, as the positivists suggested, but
their possession of a common object and mode of thought, each of
which is highly articulated. One way of approaching this structure,
which presents another contrast with the theory of implicit meaning.
is to attend to Hegel's conception of organic unity. The first image in
the Phenomenology of Spirit is that ofthe growing plant whose fruit
is not the refutation but the truth ofthe stem and blossom; in his lectures on the fine arts Hegel insists that poetry also aims at organic
unity. What must be noted here is that the notion of organic unity is
not a mere metaphor for Hegel in either of these contexts, but is
drawn from his analysis of life. As analyzed in the Phenomenoiogi'
for example, life is the entire process by which particular living
forms attain independent status, contribute through reproduction or
sustenance to the herd ox tribe and then by their death reveal their
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partiality and testify to the strength of the whole. Organic unify,
then, is not simple interrelation or harmony, but involves a conceptualizable dialectic of the one and the many which includes
negativify, opposition, and contradiction. While critics and
aestheticians sometimes interpret organic unity as if it were a
seamless whole which could tolerate no contradiction, it is part of
Hegel's conception that distinction, separation, and contingency arenecessary aspects of a genuine organic unity. In this respect his approach is more responsive to poetic experience than is the dogmatic
assertion that every poetic part must be necessary and make a difference to the whole. In each of the major genres of poetry it is even
necessary that the poem contain contingent elements; the epic, for
example, must generate a sense of facticity and inexhaustibility by
focusing on a multitude of details which might very well have been
otherwise. The .theorists of implicit meaning often treat organic
unity as an ideal by which critical evaluations are to be guided. Insofar as they have in mind the notion of the seamless whole, they
falsify that aspect of poetic experience which corresponds to the
disunities, death, and struggle which Hegel recognizes in his idea of
life; and one wonders, in any case, how such a whole could be based
on the irreducible tension involved in implicit meaning without appealing to something like Hegel's notion of infinify or totality.
For Hegel, poetry and philosophy are different modes in which
consciousness recreates for itself the dialectical pattem which it
finds in life (remembering that life has a specific meaning here). The
point of reference to the notion of life is not to endorse a vague
conception of poetry as vivid or emotional, but to stress the fact that
the way in which poetry does what the abstract understanding cannot do, is by presenting the conceptualizable and the determinate—although in an imaginative form. Poetry does not simply
reduplicate the tensions and resolutions of life, however; the poem is
not simply a quasi-organic object, as it is in Kant's aesthetics. Poetry
is the consciousness of life and its unity is not that of an abstract
universal but of human action. Aristotle also had something like this
in mind in defining poetry as the imitation of human life; for human
life is a determinate subject matter in which universal principles are
true only for the most part, thus setting up certain irreducible contradictions between the ideal as such and its instantiation. If Hegel
extends this Aristotelian thought he does so because of a
metaphysical analysis which sees the dialectical relations of human
'fe as paradigms rather than anomalies. His defense of poetry meets
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Socrates's critique by attempting to show that poetic knowledge is
self-knowledge.
Ill
The problem with analogies is that they cut in more directions
than is usually anticipated. As Hume observed, we attribute some
form of rational design to the world only at the price of picturing the
world's creator as a craftsman (or guild) of rather uncertain abilities.
Since Hegel defends the cognitive value of poetry by emphasizing its
ties to philosophy, it can very well be asked whether he views
philosophy itself as a form of poetry or if his own philosophy is simply an esoteric poem of some sort. Hostile critics have suggested that
philosophy of the Hegelian type is merely poetry, meaning, apparently, that it is (at best) a lyrical expression of an individual perspective with no more general validify than a sonnet by Wordsworth
or a Howl by Ginsberg. More sympathetic readers have suggested
that the Phenomenology of Spirit in particular is an epic, drama, or
Bildungsroman ofthe world-spirit, and that it offers insights into the
history ofhuman thought which are as profound and partial as those
that we get from Shakespeare or Goethe.
Hegel himself clearly rejects such a view because ofthe distinction
which he makes between the imaginative and the thinking comprehension of spirit's dialectic. All of the poetic genres are tied to the
immediate and specific because they present dialectical ideas only in
imaginative form. Neither the Hegelian system nor any of the particular works within it has the specific emotional unity of the reflective individual which characterizes the lyric. The breadth ofthe subject matters, the changes of perspective, and the aim at a universalit)'
which transcends such limited perspectives as the lyric offers,
suggests that the affinify might be rather with one of the more objective literary genres, the epic or drama.
Hegel does indeed consider the question whether the history ofthe
world, as an action of spirit, could be the subject of an epic. Since
many have credited Hegel with composing just such a work, it is
worth quoting his rejection of this possibility:
In this respect no doubt the most exalted action of Spirit
would be the history of the world itself. We can conceive it
possible that our poet might in this sense undertake to
elaborate in what we may call the absolute Epos this univet
sal achievement on the battlefield of the universal spir't'
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whose hero would be the spirit of man, the humanus, who is
drawn up and exalted from the clouded levels of conscious
existence into the clearer region of universal history. But in
virtue of the very fact of its universality a subject matter of
this kind would so be quite unfitted for artistic treatment. It
would not adapt itself sufficiently to individualization. For on
the one hand we fail altogether to find in such a subject a
clearly fixed background and world-condition, not merely in
relation to extemal locale, but also in that of morality and
custom. In other words, the only basis for all we could
possibly presuppose would be the universal World-Spirit or
intelligence, whom we are unable to bring visibly before us as
a particular condition, and who is possessed of the entire
Earth as his local environment.'*
In general, Hegel continues, an epic of the world-spirit presents two
possibilities: the absolute idea which governs history could be personified, embodied in a specific human form, or presented only as
the necessify underlying the actions of specific nations and worldhistorical figures. The first alternative is not feasible because "the
infinity of such a content must shatter the necessarily limited artistic
vessel of determinate individualify," while the second would collapse
into "a series of particular characters which emerged and again
disappeared in a wholly extemal succession" because the worldspirit, unable to appear as an individual agent, would be relegated to
a shadowy role behind the scenes.'*
Hegel's objection to an epic of the world-spirit is equally applicable to a dramatic version of the same story because here, too,
the specific characters could not embody a universal content. Yet
there does seem to be a strong dramatic strain in Hegel's philosophy,
although commentators have disagreed as to whether it is essentially
tragic or comic." Usually the heart of this analogy is said to lie in the
fact that drama raises up and examines an individual's career only
to show his ultimate destruction simply because of his own finitude.
In Hegel's view of comedy, in particular, the figure is one which
falsely claims a universal importance and whose dissolution leaves
the audience with a sense ofthe infinite power of spirit as opposed to
all that which is finite. Now while this pattem is recognizable both in
drama and in Hegel's philosophy itself, it manifests itself differently
IE the two modes of discourse. For the protagonists of drama are
™iite individuals, imaginatively conceived, while the actors in
legel's philosophical "comedy" are the ideas of individuality as well
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as all the major attitudes which spirit can assume in a collective
fashion. Comedy is the imaginative version of what is thought
universally in dialectical philosophy. The very analogies employed
here come from Hegel's own philosophical analjfsis of the drama in
which the forms of poetry themselves play a role analogous to (yet
distinguishable from) Falstaff or Moliere's misanthrope.
Even if these poetic interpretations of Hegel's philosophy are inconsistent, both in principle and in detail, with his own conception
of philosophy, they suggest a criticism of Hegel's system which could
be expressed in another way. The point of adopting a poetic view ofa
philosopher's work may be either to disparage what bills itself as
high metaphysics as mere poetry, whose meaning is alleged to be
emotive only, or to salvage the cognitive value of a system whose
universal and literal truth we feel impelled to deny. The first approach is one which begs the question as to the relationship between
philosophy and poetry; it represents, from Hegel's point of view, the
dichotomous thought ofthe understanding which is unable to comprehend dialectic, whether in imaginative or purely speculative form
except by noticing the bare feelings which accompany them. The
second approach is more charitable but inconsistent with Hegel's
view of philosophy. For in this context the object of comparing a
philosophical with a poetic work is to suggest that it is one perspective among several, a story told in one way which is to be complemented by stories with a different imaginative coloring. The
cognitive significance and value ofthe story is preserved insofar as it
is taken to suggest an actual pattern or order which does obtain,
even if it also attempts to include material which is properly extraneous or makes an exaggerated claim to be the exclusive version
ofthe truth.
Hegel does take up an attitude of this sort toward his
philosophical predecessors, but he holds it to be an inadequate
description of his own standpoint of absolute knowledge. Even if the
way to truth necessarily involves the sympathetic comprehension of
error, truth is one and error is manifold. At the end of his Encyclopedia Hegel makes this claim explicitly in considering the
relationship of art and philosophy: "Whereas the vision-method oS
Art . . . shivers the substantial content into many separate shaps
. . . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a
totality, but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision, and M
that raises them to selfconscious thought."" The basis ofthe contrast here is Hegel's logic of determinacy. Spirit, in its t e l i
drive towards self-knowledge, knows itself at first only vaguely
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indeterminately. Symbolic art is the poorest of artistic phases just
because it involves a juxtaposition of abstract material forms, like
the Egyptian pyramids, with a spiritual content which is merely indicated rather than manifested; it is not only that spirit in this stage
of art is indeterminate in its substance, but that its connection with
its external embodiment is subject to the radical indeterminateness
which infects all reference of the pointing or indexical variety. As we
have seen, Hegel argues that it is the purpose of poetry to overcome
such indeterminateness and that this purpose does realize itself, at
least within certain limitations. Philosophical knowledge, which
dispenses with the imaginative and figurative limitations of art and
religion, accomplishes the transition from the indeterminate to the
determinate in the realm of thought in an apparently unrestricted
fashion. The thoughts of Being and Nothing, with which Hegel
begins his Logic, are as abstract and indeterminate as thoughts can
be; an analysis of their deficiencies and contradictions eventually
leads to the concrete and determinate Absolute Idea. Spirit exhibits
a similar process, traced in the Phenomenology, in its development
from undifferentiated subjective feeling to philosophical selfknowledge. In all such movements it is the dialectical contradictions
ofthe subject matter which produce negations which are themselves
determinations. Hegel always derides the interest in the possible (the
"merely possible") for its indifference to attained actualify, whether
in art or political life.
The logic of determinacy which govems Hegel's thought is in most
cases presupposed; it is simply the form ofthe transition from a purpose or intention which is apprehended and adopted vaguely to the
concrete realization of that purpose or intention. In any such
teleological activity possibilities seem abundant at the beginning but
are gradually narrowed down as irreversible decisions are made and
we acquire a more determinate knowledge of our own purpose,
which has itself become more determinate. In the last chapter of the
^dence of Logic Hegel discusses the process of determination more
specifically. The absolute method, that is, bis method of philosophical exposition is said to be both analytic because it is attuned to
the structure of things themselves and synthetic because it observes the subject matter as tending to become other than itself. This
analytic and synthetic moment of the judgnient, "by which the
universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the
«Aer of itself K to be named the dialectical method."" The progress
of the method is from the bare or empty universal beginning to the
••l determinate conclusion. Although the method reveals that
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even the beginning is not wholly or completely indeterminate (e.g.,
being, essence, and universality are determinated distinct forms of
indeterminate beginning), the movement which it traces is from the
less to the more determinate, pursuing one determinate result on the
basis of those already attained: "First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses, the succeeding
ones becoming ever richer and more concrete."'^ Hegel seems to
deny in the case ofthe determinate and indeterminate (as he does explicitly in the case of the mediate and immediate) that there is
anything at all which is solely one or the other. But the whole progress of his system requires that in all important or significant respects that which is always tends toward greater determinateness.
The theory of implicit meaning, although not elaborated with
specific reference to Hegel, challenges this logic of determinacy insofar as it applies to poetry. It claims that ambiguify, metaphor, and
symbolism are the heart of poetry just because they are surrounded
by a halo consisting ofan indefinite variefy of possible meanings and
interpretations. At this point the theory converges with a similar
critique, this time explicitly addressed to Hegel, which bears on his
conception of philosophical meaning and communication. Much of
Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel, repeated with variations by Sartre
and Heidegger, is based on the claim that Hegel supposes an impossibly determinate relationship, amounting to identity, between
himself and his readers. According to this critique, a discursive communication, whether poetical or philosophical must exhibit a certain
amount of indeterminateness simply in order to engage its readers.
Since the reader as an actually existing person lives by continually
projecting possibilities of action and understanding, communication
is defeated by the assumption that he can coincide with the author in
a determinate "we" which excludes further possibilities of interpretation. Such a completely determinate communication would
mean the end of the reader's existence. What is required for
philosophical communication, then, is an analogue of Socratic
dialectic or Platonic dialogue which preserves the readers
possibilities and allows him to generate "fresh words" in his own
soul. The existentialist critique of Hegel aims at demonstrating thai
in neglecting the Socratic problem of the written word he did not
take a sufficiently dialectical attitude toward his own dialectic
Taking this line of criticism together with the previous one, they converge in the claim that the distinction between determinate and indeterminate meaning does not lead to an adequate account of the
difference between poetic and philosophical discourse.

GARY SHAPIRO

105

To the extent that Hegel is committed to a logic of determinateness, he sees the metaphorical character of poetry as a
necessary defect and the philosophical appeal to possibilify as a
failure to achieve wisdom which shrouds itself in a mystery. The
scorn which Hegel addresses to the appeal to the merely possible in
the moral life has its counterpart here in his theory of discourse. In
both areas it answers to a common and substantial intuitive
preference for the articulate and developed as opposed to the incomplete and fragmentary. Nevertheless, the contrast between the
concretely actual and the vaguely possible seems undialectical in its
dualism. It appears to rest on the assumption that the determinate
(or actual) and the indeterminate (or possible) are inversely related.
Yet this seems to be one of those principles of the understanding
which Hegel was so skillful at dissolving by an appeal to experience
and dialectic. One who has a determinate situation in life and actual
talents or skills certainly has more genuine possibilities of action
than the man who refrains from any definite undertaking so as to
remain free for all possibilities. In general, the actual must arise out
of some set of possibilities, but once actual, it offers a new set of
possibilities.^" The principle is operative in both poetic and
philosophical discourse. It is the complex and highly structured
work, whether Shakespeare's plays or Hegel's Phenomenology,
which is typically the ground of many interpretations. Here there is
an observable reciprocity of the possible and the actual, for interpretation is a development of possibilities ingredient in the actual
structure of a work. There is something puzzling about Hegel's
failure to discem the dialectical relationship of the actual and the
possible; if he had, the result might have been a recognition of the
pluralism inherent in philosophical as well as poetic discourse. The
germ of truth in the poetic interpretations of Hegel's philosophy,
then, is the reintroduction of indeterminateness into a system which
seeks to exclude it by comprehending it. Whether in regard to poetry
or philosophy, however, the altemative to the priorify of the actual
need not be the priority of the possible, as the theorists of implicit
meaning and the existentialists have supposed. To retum to the
question of poetic meaning, it should be possible to account both for
the dialectic of spirit which Hegel recognizes in great poetry as well
as those holistic pattems of metaphor and image to which modern
criticism has drawn our attention. Fire in the Iliad, sight and blindness in Oedipus, or the storms in Shakespeare's plays tend to be
neglected in Hegel's account of these poems just because of his
""'directional logic of determinateness. If modem critics have tend-
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ed to give brilliant but one-sided accounts of such metaphors which
omit the dialectic of spirit, Hegel sees the dialectic but omits the implicit dimension ofthe poem. What is needed is an analysis of poetic
meaning which does some justice to the relations of the actual and
the possible or of spiritual meaning and metaphorical tension.^'
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